a hierarchy, among the most commonly used types of dependability models, according to their modeling power. Among the combinatorial (non-state-space) model types, we show that fault trees with repeated events are the most powerful in terms of kinds of dependencies among various system components that can be modeled (which is one metric of modeling power). Reliability graphs are less powerful than fault trees with repeated events but more powerful than reliabrrity block diagrams and fault trees without repeated events. By virtue of the constructive nature of our proofs, we provide algorithms for converting from one model type to another. Among the Markov (state-space) model types, we consider continuous-time Markov chains, generalized stochastic Petri nets, Markov reward models, and &ochasW ' reward wts. These are more powerful than combinatorial-model types in that they can capture dependencies such as a shared repair facility between system components. However, they are analytically tractable only under certain distributional assumptions such as exponential failure-& repair-time distributions. They are also subject to an exponentially large state space. The equivalence among various Markov-model types is well known and thus only briefly discussed.
Fault-tolerant computer systems are used in a variety of applications that require high reliability or availability. For instance, computer systems in flight-control in aircraft & spacecraft require that the system provide service, without failing, until the end of mission. Such systems have a high reliability requirement. On the other hand, computer systems in database applications and communication networks are required to be operational for as high a fraction of time as possible (there is no critical mission time in this case). Such systems are required to possess high availability. Laprie [ 11 coined the term dependability as a measure of the quality, correctness, and continuity of service delivered by a system. Dependability encompasses measures such as reliability, availability, and safety.
Over the years, several model types such as reliability block diagrams, fault trees, and Markov chains, have been used to model fault-tolerant systems and to evaluate various dependability measures. These model types differ from one another not only in the ease of use in a particular application but in terms of modeling power. For instance, a series-parallel2 system is reasonably modeled by a series-parallel reliability block diagram. Similarly, fault trees are more intuitive in capturing how a component failure propagates into a higher level subsystem or system failure. Thus some model types lend themselves easily to model certain kind of behavior of systems. Modeling power of a model type is determined by the kinds of dependencies within subsystems that can be modeled and the kind of dependability measures that can be computed. For instance, if various components of a system share a repair person (repair dependency among components), then FT or RBD cannot easily be used to model the availability of this system. Markov chains and stochastic Petri nets can easily model such a repair dependency.
From a variety of model types, a particular model type is chosen to specify a model. The choice of a suitable model type is determined by factors such as:
Constraints

Familiarity of the user with the model type The model type supported by the available modeling tool-kit
Choices
Ease of use in a particular application The kind of system and system behavior to be modeled The measure of system behavior to be computed Conciseness and ease of model specification This paper analyzes the choices category and ignores the constraints category (although it is obviously important in some situations). The modeler's decision process can be greatly simplified by comparing model types according to:
modeling power conciseness of model specification.
Little has been done to compare formally the dependabilitymodel types. Ref [2, 3] summarize the dependability-model types.
These studies informally discuss model types, the kinds of dependencies that can be modeled by them, and dependability measures that can be evaluated using these model types. However, 'Acronyms, nomenclature, and notation are given at the end of the Introduction.
'The terms, series / parallel are used in their logicdiagram sense, irrespective of the schematicdiagram or physical-layout.
to the best of our knowledge, there has been no formal comparative evaluation of model types except for the following studies.
Using probabilistic arguments, Shooman [4] showed the equivalence of RBD & FT (without repeated events); ie, any system that can be modeled by RBD can also be modeled by FT and vice-versa. Hura & Atwood [5] showed how Petri net models can represent s-coherent fault trees. They showed that an equivalent Petri net representation allows study of dynamic behavior of the model and offers more insightful treatment of fault detection & propagation. However, they do not show that Petri nets can model certain systems which can not be modeled by FT.
4
This paper is mainly concerned with the modeling power of the following dependability-model types: Some of the relationships our study reveal are obvious and some are not so obvious. Our aim is to provide a modeler with a powerhierarchy of dependability-model types which enable the modeler to select from a variety of model types for a given problem.
Section 2 describes the fault-tolerant multiprocessor system that is the illustrative example in this paper. Section 3 describes combinatorial-model types. Section 4 establishes powerhierarchy among combinatorial-model types. Section 5 briefly discusses Markov-model types and compares them to combinatorial-model types. Section 6 shows the overall power hierarchy. 
Acronyms-'
CTMC
FAULT-TOLERANT MULTIPROCESSOR SYSTEM AN EXAMPLE
A fault-tolerant multiprocessor system is a running example in this paper. Figure 1 shows the basic multiprocessor architecture; it consists of two processors P I & P2, each with a private memory M I & M2 respectively. A processor and its memory form a processing unit. Each processing unit is connected to a mirrored-disk system. This forms a processing subsystem. Both processing units are connected via an interconnection network N . The system is functional while N is functional and at least one of the processing subsystems is functional. For a processing subsystem to be functional, the processor, memory module, and at least one of the two disks must be functional. For simplicity & illustration, we restrict ourselves to this 2-processor system. This architecture and the corresponding models are easily scaled to many processors.
COMBINATORIAL MODEL TYPES
Reliability Block Diagrams
RBD fall into the category of combinaforiul (also known as non-sfufe-space) model types [2, 31. They map the operational dependency of a system on its components and not the actual physical structure. In Shooman's [4] words, RBD represent the probability-of-success approach to system modeling. stochastic reward net.
%e singular / plural of an acronym are always spelled the same. The subsystem representing series components implies that failure of any component results in failure of that subsystem. The subsystem representing parallel components implies that only the failure of all the components results in failure of that subsystem. Figure 2 shows the RBD model for the fault-tolerant multiprocessor.
1 .
Figure 2. RED Model of the Multiprocessor System
Some researchers have used RBD with repeated blocks [6, 71. However, we use RBD without repeated blocks.
Fault Trees Without Repeated Events
Like RBD, a FT is also a combinatorial-model type and maps the operational dependency of a system on its components. However, unlike RBD, FT represent a probability-of-failure approach to system modeling [4] . The phrase 'without repeated events' means that inputs to all the gates are distinct. Figure  3 shows the FT model for the fault-tolerant multiprocessor. Failure of a component implies that the corresponding input to the gate becomes True. The output of an OR gate is False iff all inputs are False. The output of an AND gate is True iff all inputs are True. The output of the top gate in the FT tells whether the system is operational or not. We allow only AND & OR gates in the fault trees (FT & FTRE) we consider in this paper.
Many authors have proposed extensions to FT, eg, allowing repeated events. Some of them have included gates such as NOT, EXOR, PAND (priority AND), kOfn, and some special gates such as cold spare, functional dependency, and sequence enforcing [8] . Some of these extensions enhance the modeling power of fault trees and some simply increase the ease of use. We consider fault trees with repeated events next.
Fault Trees with Repeated Events
Fault trees in which 'gates are allowed to share inputs' are FTRE, and are more general than an FT. Consider a simple variation on the base multiprocessor system shown in figure 1 :
there is a shared memory M3 between P1 & Pz. Figure 4 shows the new system. If memory module Mi fails, then processor Pi uses memory module M3 and continues to work; M3 can also be shared by both P1 & P2 if both M I & M2 fail. Neither RBD nor FT, as we have described, can model the dependability of this system. FTRE can model the dependability of this system as shown in figure 5 . This example shows that FTRE possess higher modeling power than FT or RBD because any RBD or FT model can also be modeled by FTRE. As mentioned in section 3.1, RBD with repeated blocks [6, 71 (analogous to the repeated events in a fault tree) have been used. RBD with repeated blocks have the same modeling power as FTRE. Shooman [4] has shown that a RBD is equivalent to a FT without repeated events, but did not provide a conversion algorithm. It is simple to do so. Comparison of the RBD in figure 2 and the FT in figure 3 reveals the similarities among the two model types. These similarities provide the algorithm for converting a FT model to an equivalent RBD model. The algorithm is given in PASCAL-like pseudo-code in figure 7.
FT to RBD
The FT is converted to the equivalent RBD by starting the algorithm as FT-to-RBD (roof) where roof is the root node of the FT. 
Reliability Graphs
Graphs have been extensively used as model types to model network reliability [9] . We consider a special class of digraphs as a model type in the software tool SHARPE [lo] . A reliability graph G = ( U, V) is an acyclic digraph. There are two special nodes labeled source & sink in U. The source node has no incoming edges and the sink node has no outgoing edges. V has 2 kinds of edges: component-edges and oo-edges. For each component, there is at most 1 edge in the RG, ie, repeated edges
FT-to_RBD ( y ) end are not allowed. Failure of a component is indicated by failure of an edge; =-edges and nodes do not fail. The system model- This algorithm is simply a preorder traversal of the FT. If the node encountered is a gate (AND or OR), then it is converted to appropriate construct (PARALLEL and SERIES, respectivewith-no failed edge from the source node to the sink node. Figure  6 shows the RG of the multiprocessor system with shared memory. ly).-If the node is a component (a leaf), then do nothing. This yields the RBD. There are n leaves in the FT; thus there are at most n-1 gates. Every step of the algorithm uses 0(1) time. Hence, the time complexity of this algorithm is O ( n ) .
RBD to FT
An RBD can be similarly converted to a FT in a reciprocal fashion. The algorithm is in figure 8. The time-complexity of this algorithm is O ( n ) as well. 
FT to RG
We now show that any FT can be converted to a RG. We prove this claim by an algorithm to convert a FT to an equivalent RG . Assumption 1. In a FT, a node is either a gate or a component. 4 The algorithm is in pseudocode in figure 9 . We briefly describe it below. For the FT model of the multiprocessor system in figure 3, figure 10 shows the steps taken by this algorithm. Due to preorder traversal of this FT, the nodes are looked at in the following order:
Omitting the nodes, corresponding to the components (since we do nothing at these nodes), we are left with gates, The first (top) element of figure 10 shows the initialization of the RG. Each subsequent element shows the partially constructed RG at the end of each step when the gates are encountered in the order ( G I , G2, G,, G~, G~, G s ) .
RG to FT
We have shown that any FT can be converted to an equivalent RG. Since RBD & FT can be converted to one another, it implies that any RBD can also be converted to an equivalent RG. We now show that the converse is not true: not every RG can be converted to an equivalent FT. We prove this by showing that an example RG (shown in figure 11 ) cannot be converted to an equivalent FT. For every RG, there exists an equivalent Boolean expression that captures the operational dependence of the modeledsystem on the system-components. The literals of this Boolean expression represent the system-components. In the RG in figure  11 the components are labeled A,B,C,D,E. Assign to each component a logical value of '0 when it is operational' and '1 when it is failed'; then the Boolean expression for this RG is:
S = ( A + D ) ( A + C ) ( B + C ) ( B + E ) .
(1)
When the value of (1) is 0, the system is operational; otherwise the system is failed. Following the principles of minimal OR-AND (or AND-OR) realization (where the total number of inputs to a gate is minimized) of a Boolean expression [ 1 13, one can show that (1) cannot be reduced to an equivalent form in which all literals occur only once. Therefore (1) cannot be represented by a FT (which is similar to a combinational circuit) in which no input is repeated. We have shown, by an example, that not every RG can be converted to an equivalent FT. Since FT are equivalent to RBD, this also proves that not every RG can converted to an equivalent RBD.
RG to FTRE
The basic idea behind this algorithm is to enumerate all the simple paths from the source node to the sink node. This is easily done using a breadth-first search [12] . For every path, construct an OR gate with inputs from all the components which appear on this path (oo-edges are ignored). Then construct an AND gate (root gate) such that the output of each OR constructed in the previous step is input to this gate. This is the equivalent FTRE for the RG. Events are repeated if different paths are not edge-disjoint, ie, different paths have edges in common. All the paths can be enumerated using a naive algorithm which takes exponential (0( 2e) ) time ( e is the number of edges in the RG) since there could be as many as O(2e) distinct paths. More sophisticated algorithms which yield more compact FTRE can be derived based on min-paths of the RG which can be computed using the Tarjan [13] algorithm. The pseudo-code of a generic algorithm to convert a reliability graph into an FTRE which uses some path enumeration algorithm is in figure 12. Our aim is simply to establish that a RG can be converted to a FTRE, not to provide optimal algorithms for conversion. The correctness of this algorithm can be argued as follows. A system modeled by a RG is operational as long as there is a path from source node to the sink node. A failed edge in a RG blocks all the paths it appears on. This can be stated as: a system is operational iff there is at least one path which has no failed edge. This is precisely what the above constructed FTRE captures. For the RG of the base architecture with shared memory (figure 6), the paths possible from the src to the sink are : Figure 13 shows the equivalent FTRE, as constructed by algorithm RG-toJ;TRE.
It must be realized however, that a shared edge among different paths in a RG does not always imply that an equivalent FT (without repeated events) does not exist. An example of this appears in figure 14 , where the edge labeled C appears on both the paths from src to sink. 
FTRE to RG
Section 4.5 proved that any RG can be converted to an equivalent FTRE. This section shows that the converse is not true: there does not always exist an equivalent RG for every FTRE. We prove this claim by means of a counter-example. Consider a TMR system with 3 components A,B,C. The system is operational as long as at least 2 components are operational. Figure 15 shows a FTRE model of this system. This FTRE can not be converted to a RG. To prove this, assume that an equivalent RG does exist. Let the componentedges representing components A,B,C in this RG be ea = (uapva), eb= (ub,vb)p ec = (~o V C ) , btpa,bp Pb,c, Pa,c be the paths from the source to the sink which includes edges ( ea,eb), ( eb,ec), (ea,ec) respectively. Thus, Pira.6, Pi:b,c, pi:a,c ( i = 1,2,3) are paths consisting only of --edges. The paths Pa,b, Pb,c, pa,c are not necessarily edgedisjoint, ie, there could be edges common to more than one path. Figure 16 shows this RG. This Pb consists of only 1 component-edge eb; the rest are oo-edges. This implies that there exists a path from the source to the sink such that it consists of only 1 component edge. This in turn implies that the system is operational if B is operational even though both A & C can have failed. This contradicts our assumption about the operational dependency of the system on A,B,C. Therefore, the assumption that an equivalent RG exists for this FTRE is incorrect.
Q. E. D.
It can be similarly shown that any system which has a kOFn gate where k > liub( %n) (at least k out of n components must be operational for the system to be operational) can not be modeled by a RG. As another example, consider the multiprocessor system with shared memory. If we impose the constraint that memory module M3 can be used by only one processor PI or P2, then failure of only one memory module M I or M2 could be tolerated, ie, failure of both MI & M2 leads to system failure. It is easy to construct the FTRE model for such a system. However, we claim that a RG model for this system can not be constructed.
We have established the hierarchy among combinatorialmodel types -from most powerful to least powerful: FTRE RG RBD/FT (these are equivalent to each other). Figure 17a shows the CTMC of a system that consists of 2 components C1 & C2 which share a repair facility with priority repair discipline. The failure rate of Ci is Xi and the repair rate is pi. Cl has repair priority over C2: if Cl fails while C, is being repaired, then repair of C2 is preempted, repair of C1 begins, and the repair of C2 resumes after C1 is repaired. Assume further that this system can be in one of states 1,2,3 at time zero with probabilities wl,w2, w3, respectively; figure  17b shows the equivalent GSPN model. 
MARKOV MODEL TYPES
CTMC to GSPN
Converting a CTMC to a GSPN model is fairly obvious. For each state si of the CTMC, construct a place p i . Replace each arc ( si,sj) with rate rid of the Markov model by a transition f i j of rate rid with an incoming arc from pi and an outgoing arc to pi. If there is a single initial state sinit of the CTMC, then a single token must be put in pinit. If the CTMC has several initial states sk,sk+ l.. . . ,sm with probabilities q . , W k + l r . . . ,~m , then a new place po is created with a single token, and po is connected to pk,pk+ l,. . . ,pm via immediate transitions tO,k,to,k+ l,. .. ,to,,, with probabilities W k , U k + . . ,U,,,.
SRN to MRM
Ciardo et al [ 171 formalize SRN and provide an algorithm to convert an SRN into an equivalent MRM. In an SRN, the rewards are specified using a reward function. A typical reward function is: "If therC are x tokens in place p, then reward rate is r,, else if there are y tokens in place p , then reward rate is r,,, else reward rate is rZ." Based on this reward function, a reward rate is associated with each tangible marking of the SRN.
Each tangible marking corresponds to a state of the underlying CTMC. When reward rates are associated with each state of the CTMC, it becomes an MRM.
MRM to SRN
Conversion from MRM to SRN is divided in two parts:
1. Convert the states of the MRM to the SRN structure of places & transitions. This is done exactly the same way as a CTMC is converted to a GSPN (see section 5.2).
2. Convert the reward rate specification of the MRM to 4 reward rate specification of the SRN.
We describe this procedure using the example in figure 17 . Let ri be the reward rate associated with state si of the CTMC in figure 17a . According to the procedure in section 5. There also exists a tradeoff in the kinds of dependability measures that can be computed from different model types. For example, availability & reliability can be computed relatively easily using combinatorial-model types. However, computing the system mean time to failure using combinatorialmodel types can be quite complex if distributions are nonexponential. Availability of repairable systems can be modeled by combinatorial-model types only under the assumption that each system component has an s-independent repair person. However, Markov-model types can model the scenarios where a repair person is shared among various system components. 
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